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There are relatively few who would argue that tackling 
climate change, and therefore reducing carbon emissions, 
should not be a priority for society and the energy sector.  
But significant increases in energy prices are a necessary 
consequence of that policy.  Using published sources this 
paper estimates that by 2020 UK and EU regulatory 
mechanisms designed to promote lower carbon energy will 
increase average household electricity prices by between 
23% and 42%, and median industrial electricity prices by 
between 30% and 60%. 
 
Achieving Scottish and UK climate change targets will 
require a major expansion of low carbon electricity 
generation – with a consequent investment of £ billions 
over the next 2 decades or so.  The UK government’s 
expectation is that this investment will very largely be 
delivered by the commercial sector – whether the 
investment is in renewable energy, cleaner use of fossil 
fuels, nuclear power, or development of related 
infrastructure (such as extension and reinforcement of the 
electricity grid).   The implication of delivering cleaner 
energy through commercial investment is that the full costs 
of delivering a lower carbon future will be passed through 
to consumers in the form of higher electricity prices – and 
that this increase in prices can probably be expected to at 
least last the lifetime of the next generation of power 
stations (30 years or more).  In addition some lower carbon 
technologies (such as renewable energy, or carbon capture 
and storage for fossil fuelled power stations) are expected 
to require significant ongoing subsidy to make returns 
attractive to commercial investors.  The mechanisms 
favoured by the government (such as the renewables 
obligation, carbon trading, and regulatory intervention) all 
mean the additional costs of any subsidy required for 
cleaner electricity will be passed on to consumers (rather 
than alternative mechanisms than would use taxation to 
redistribute the costs).  As industrial electricity prices are 
around 30% lower than household electricity prices, if the 
price increases are distributed evenly across all electricity 
consumers, the percentage increase in industrial energy 
bills will be greater than the increase in household energy 
bills. 
 
Just to be clear, the costs of reducing the carbon impact of 
electricity are all additional to future price increases that 
could occur due to underlying increases in the costs of the 
main primary fuels used in electricity generation (coal, gas, 
and uranium).  Increases in primary fuel prices (due in part 
to increased demand from fast growing economies such 
China and India) have already resulted in an average 46% 
increase in retail electricity prices in the UK since 2005
1
. 
 
In an interview in the Financial Times on 4 June 2008, Paul 
Golby, the chief executive of one of the UK’s major 
generators, Eon, warned that consumers needed to 
prepare themselves for structurally higher prices in order to 
meet the requirement for new investment in nuclear power 
stations and renewable energy, and to replace existing 
aging energy infrastructure.  He suggested that investment 
in energy infrastructure in the UK could reach £100 billion 
or more by 2020.  The UK is not in an unusual position – 
the International Energy Agency projects that $17 trillion 
investment is needed in energy infrastructure by 2030
2
. 
 
Given that there is a GB electricity market these additional 
costs will tend to be spread across all GB consumers – no 
matter whether investment in new cleaner generation is 
being made in Scotland, England, or Wales.   The Scottish 
Government has devolved powers which would allow it to 
vary policies in relation to the renewables obligation and 
carbon trading.  However the GB-wide electricity market, 
and the EU-wide trading mechanism for carbon emissions, 
would tend to level out differences in the costs of policies 
across all GB consumers, and it would therefore seem 
unlikely in current circumstances that different Scottish 
policies would result in significant differentiation of 
electricity prices in Scotland from those elsewhere in the 
UK. 
 
The size of the challenge 
Both the UK and Scotland are setting ambitious targets for 
reducing carbon emissions. The UK Government is 
committed to reducing carbon emissions by 60% by 2050, 
and the Scottish Government has consulted on a target to 
deliver an 80% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050
3
.  
The energy sector is responsible for 36% of UK carbon 
emissions
4
, and in Scotland the three main fossil fuelled 
power stations (Longannet, Cockenzie, and Peterhead) 
typically emit around 35% of Scotland’s total net carbon 
emissions (with Longannet being the largest of these)
5
.  
Power generation is the largest single contributor to UK 
and Scottish carbon emissions.  Due to the size and nature 
of its emissions (from a relatively small number of large, 
easily identified and monitored sources), and the industry’s 
ability to pass through the costs of new investment to 
consumers, the power generation industry has been for 
some time one of the major targets of regulatory action to 
reduce carbon emissions at both European and member 
state level. By their nature, emissions from the transport 
and the domestic sector are more difficult to target 
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effectively - and therefore the power sector can expect to 
be a major target for governmental carbon reduction 
initiatives for decades to come. 
 
Renewable energy support 
Currently most forms of renewable generation would not be 
commercially viable without some form of additional 
financial support
6
.  The main method used by the UK and 
Scottish Governments to support the development of 
renewable electricity is the Renewables Obligation (or RO).  
The RO places an obligation on UK suppliers to source a 
proportion of their electricity from renewable sources.  This 
proportion increases every year – and for 2008-09 is 9.1%
7
  
Suppliers effectively meet this obligation through 
generating renewable electricity, or purchasing it from other 
generators, or by paying a buy out price for any shortfall.  
Generators are issued Renewable Obligation Certificates 
(ROCs) in proportion to the amount of renewable electricity 
they generate.  The price of a ROC (1 ROC is issued for 
each MWh generated) is determined by the total amount of 
renewable generation in the UK, and the gap between this 
and the obligation level set by the RO.  In 2006-07 the total 
value of a single ROC to a supplier was £49.28
8
.      
 
The total value of ROCs to suppliers in 2006/07 was over 
£700 million.  35% of these ROCs were earned by 
generation facilities located in Scotland.    The costs of this 
subsidy are passed on to consumers throughout the UK via 
their electricity bills -  currently representing around 2.5% of 
a typical electricity bill.  As the level of the RO increases so 
will the costs to consumers.  Analysis by Ofgem
9
 suggests 
that by 2020 the total cost of the RO will have increased to 
around £2.7 billion per annum – and will represent around 
10% of the average bill by 2020 – representing a 7.5% 
increase in consumer electricity prices (this is similar to the 
7% increase estimated by the UK Energy White Paper).    
 
In order to maintain investor confidence the UK Energy 
White Paper “Meeting the Energy Challenge“ committed 
the UK Government to retaining the renewables obligation 
until 2027 – so the cost of the RO will be met by 
consumers, and is likely to continue to increase, for at least 
20 years. 
 
Ofgem has called on the UK Government to examine other 
methods of subsidising renewable generation.   It estimates 
that the RO mechanism costs £63-140 per tonne of CO2 
abated (a similar estimate to that produced by the NAO) – 
and notes that carbon abatement is currently available at 
much lower costs through mechanisms such as the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (see below).  It should be 
noted however that this ignores other arguments for the 
development of renewables – such as the potential to 
export renewable technologies to other countries (though 
there are other support mechanisms specifically designed 
to promote research, development and demonstration of 
new clean energy technologies – so the question would 
remain as to   whether the RO is the most effective means 
of achieving this goal). 
Grid enhancement  
Scotland and the UK have significant renewable energy 
resources – in the form of wind, wave and tidal energy.  
However much of this resource is distant from the main 
centres of population.  The existing electricity grid was built 
to support a system of centralised generation – with power 
stations located close to centres of population – and 
transmission and distribution systems constructed to 
support lower electricity loads in more sparsely populated 
areas.  Capturing renewable energy in significant amounts, 
and transmitting it to centres of population, will require 
significant investment in the extension and reinforcement of 
the electricity grid.  These costs and their recovery is 
regulated by Ofgem, and are passed on to consumers 
through their electricity bills.   
 
Transmission and distribution charges are reviewed every 
5 years. In the current period Ofgem has authorised over 
£10 billion to be spent on ensuring electricity networks 
deliver a reliable service and can expand to meet the 
needs of renewable energy.  This represents a 48% 
increase in expenditure on distribution networks over the 
previous review period, and a 125% increase in 
expenditure on transmission networks.  This represents an 
extra 1.5% on average domestic electricity bills
10
.   
 
Studies predict that significant additional expenditure on 
the grid will be required to support future development of 
renewable energy
11
.  Though the amount of investment 
required is currently difficult to quantify.  The UK Energy 
White Paper
12
 acknowledges that the development of 
renewable energy will require significant further investment 
in transmission infrastructure – but states that no detailed 
studies have been undertaken to estimate the future costs 
of enhancement.  Given that all parties appear to agree 
that significant further investment will be necessary this 
paper has made an assumption that the need for additional 
investment in the grid will continue at the current rate until 
2020 – and will therefore result in a 3% increase in 
domestic energy bills over that period (however it should be 
noted that there is no detailed analysis underlying this 
assumption – the real figure could be higher or lower). 
 
Tackling intermittency 
Demand for electricity varies significantly by time of day 
and time of year – as domestic and industrial heating and 
lighting requirements change.  Typically peak demand will 
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occur at around 6.30 pm on a cold winter’s day – and will 
be just under 3 times the demand experienced at around 
5.30 am on a summer’s day.
13
  Generators and the 
National Grid use a portfolio of generation options 
(switching the level of generation from a mix of different 
types of power stations), and regulatory and energy trading 
systems, to match electricity supply to consumer demand.  
However most forms of renewable energy are not 
controllable – ie they cannot be switched on at will if the 
primary energy source (eg wind, wave, tide, sunlight) on 
which they rely is not available at that time.  This is not a 
problem when renewable energy is a relatively low 
proportion of total generation (as other forms of generation 
can easily compensate for the variation in renewable 
generation) – but could become an issue as renewable 
energy begins to make up a larger proportion of generation. 
There are solutions available.   Energy generated from 
renewable sources can be stored – e.g. through pumped 
storage, battery systems, or hydrogen. However technical 
and commercial factors currently limit the use of electricity 
storage on large scale.   Therefore a significant amount of 
thermal generation is likely to be required as a reserve – 
with fossil-fuel power stations kept “hot” and available to 
run at short notice.  But energy storage,  back-up 
generation, and additional contractual balancing 
mechanisms do not come at zero cost – large energy 
storage systems would require significant capital 
investment, and generators will seek compensation for the 
capital and operating costs of power stations used as back-
up.  These costs will be passed through to consumers.  
UKERC made a comparative study of over 200 earlier 
studies into the costs of intermittency
14
 – and estimated 
that for a 20% penetration of intermittent generation 
(predominantly wind) in the UK meeting the costs of 
intermittency would require a 1 to 1.5% increase in 
household electricity bills.    
 
Carbon capture and storage 
As mentioned above, power plants are very significant 
emitters of carbon dioxide – with Scotland’s three largest 
power stations (Longannet, Cockenzie, and Peterhead) – 
producing around 35% of Scotland’s net carbon emissions. 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is a process in which 
carbon dioxide emissions are captured from the flue gases 
from power plants or other facilities – reducing their carbon 
emissions by around 90%.  The carbon dioxide is then 
stored permanently – usually in some type of geological 
structure, such as a depleted oil and gas reservoir.   CCS 
has the potential to enable very large reductions in CO2 
emissions from electricity generators and major industrial 
energy users – and currently it appears that CCS will need 
to be an element of both UK and Scottish approaches to 
meeting climate change targets.  The EU has also set an 
objective of new fossil-fuel power plants deploying CCS by 
2020  (if possible).
15 
 
 
However CCS faces a number of significant challenges: 
 
 the technologies are often innovative;  
 the costs for any single CCS project are very 
large; 
 achieving a commercial rate of return on early 
CCS projects appears unlikely; 
 the infrastructure to support CCS projects by and 
large does not exist; 
 the regulatory environment is currently uncertain; 
 commercial operators are unlikely to be willing to 
pick up the long term liability for carbon stores  (though it 
appears this liability may be accepted by UK Government); 
 the best potential locations for carbon stores in 
Scotland and the UK have not yet been identified and 
assessed. 
 
Overcoming these barriers will require joint action from 
industry, government (UK, Scottish, and European) and 
regulators – and a mechanism to deliver significant 
financial support.  CCS generating plants incur significantly 
higher costs due to: 
 
 increased fuel consumption (perhaps 25% higher 
to deliver the equivalent power output to a non-CCS plant); 
 capital investment in carbon capture equipment; 
 capital investment in carbon transportation; 
 capital investment in carbon storage; 
 increased operational costs due to the above 
infrastructure and activities. 
 
Given that coal-fired plants generally emit significantly 
more CO2 per MWh than gas-fired generation there is 
normally significantly greater environmental benefit in fitting 
CCS to coal-fired power stations.  For example, Scotland’s 
two coal-fired stations (Longannet and Cockenzie) emit 
around 30% of Scotland’s total net carbon emissions.   
 
Studies have produced a broad range of estimates for the 
additional costs of electricity from CCS facilities.  A report 
from energy consultants Poyry
16
 suggested that coal fired 
CCS plants would incur additional costs of around £22 per 
tonne of CO2 (equivalent to around £22.3 per MWh).  But 
given the early state of the CCS industry   such estimates 
may prove to have significant inaccuracies.   
 
The additional costs of CCS could be met through a range 
of mechanisms – and these would need to offer support to 
CCS facilities for 20 years or more.  Should the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (see below) deliver high carbon 
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prices – and be able to guarantee these prices over a long 
time-period (something that it has failed to deliver so far) – 
then this mechanism could fund the development of CCS in 
power plants.   In this case the costs of deploying CCS 
would not be additional to the costs of the EU ETS set out 
below.    
 
Another option for funding CCS would be regulation 
requiring CCS to be fitted to all fossil-fuelled power 
stations.  This would allow energy companies to pass the 
full costs on to consumers – but might be a high-risk 
approach for governments to take ahead of the costs of 
CCS becoming clear, and the technologies being fully 
developed.   
 
A further option would be the creation of a feed-in tariff 
which would guarantee a higher price for electricity from 
CCS power plants.  This approach has been used 
successfully in other countries (eg to support the 
deployment of photovoltaic systems in Germany) – but 
once again would seem a difficult approach to take ahead 
of knowing the costs of CCS.   
 
The common factor in the above three approaches – EU 
ETS, regulatory compulsion, or feed-in tariffs – is that the 
costs of CCS would be passed to consumers. 
 
In some cases it may be possible to off-set some or all of 
the costs of CCS through using carbon dioxide to enhance 
the recovery of oil from depleted reservoirs (Enhanced Oil 
Recovery – or EOR).  This is technically feasible and is 
being used commercially in some US oil fields - but the 
economics of EOR remain unproved in UK waters and 
further study into its commercial feasibility is required.  
Given current oil prices it can be expected that oil 
companies will wish to examine this opportunity.   
 
The Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage is currently 
undertaking a joint study into CCS and EOR opportunities 
in Scotland - involving Scottish universities, power 
companies, oil companies, and the Scottish Government. 
 
Given that the costs of CCS remain uncertain – and that 
these costs may be met through the EU ETS in any case – 
no additional costs for delivering CCS have been factored 
into this paper’s view of future electricity prices. 
 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
The Stern Review
17
 stated that “establishing a carbon 
price, through tax, trading or regulation, is an essential 
foundation for climate-change policy”.  The EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the EU’s primary mechanism 
for creating a market value in the reduction of carbon 
emissions, and will act to embed the cost of carbon 
emissions in the goods and services that we all consume.  
It is therefore designed to act most strongly on those 
sectors which emit the most carbon, or consume the 
greatest amount of energy.  As the sector which is the 
single largest carbon emitter, and for its capacity to pass 
through the costs of regulatory measures to consumers, 
the power generation sector has been deliberately targeted 
by the European Commission and the UK government 
more strongly than other sectors.    
 
Under the EU ETS sectors are allocated allowances for the 
carbon emissions they are expected to emit.  If an 
organisation wishes to emit more than its allowance then it 
can buy additional allowances on an EU wide market.  If an 
organisation has surplus allowances it can sell these.  The 
total amount of allowances allocated across the EU is 
subject to an absolute cap.   In the UK the electricity 
industry will progressively be allocated fewer carbon 
allowances and required to buy the extra allowances it 
requires in auctions. 
 
In 2012 Phase III of the EU ETS will come into force.  In the 
March 2008 budget the Chancellor announced that the UK 
would implement 100% auctioning of carbon allowances for 
the electricity industry.  Under this system large electricity 
producers will be obliged to buy all the carbon allowances 
they require.  Given the relative insulation of the power 
sector from external competition we can expect the full cost   
of these allowances to be passed on to consumers as the 
sector seeks to maintain profit margins.   
 
A range of estimates exist for the cost impact of the EU 
ETS.  The European Commission’s own assessment of the 
impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme estimates that 
a carbon price of €22 per tonne will result in an increase in 
retail electricity prices of between 19% and 26% by 2020 
(the level of increase depending on the size of the 
consumer).
18
   The paper goes on to argue that the price 
impact of EU ETS may already be partially priced into 
current European retail electricity prices – and that the 
actual price impact of Phase II could therefore be lower - in 
the range of 10% to 15%.    The UK Energy White Paper 
(May 2007)  stated that “assuming an EU ETS carbon price 
in 2020 of around €15-25t/CO2, the impact on retail 
electricity prices could be a 14-23% increase for industrial, 
and a 10-15% increase for household consumers, 
compared to if there were no carbon price.”    However it is 
worth noting that since the White Paper’s publication 
sterling has slipped by around 18% against the euro (the 
currency in which EU ETS carbon allowances are priced).  
Using more recent exchange rates would give an estimated 
increase of 12% to 18% for household electricity prices 
from the EU ETS. 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
Pages 63-69 
 
The above increases may seem relatively modest.  
However, there are forecasts that the price of carbon could 
be significantly higher than the scenarios given above. In 
June 2008 Deutsche Bank revised its estimates of 2020 
carbon prices upwards from €35 to €40 per t/CO2.
19
  A 
price which would (with 100% auctioning for the power 
sector, and at current exchange rates) suggest a 43% 
increase in UK electricity prices for industrial energy users, 
and a 29% increase in domestic energy prices. 
 
Energy efficiency 
Energy efficiency measures are often one of the quickest 
and most effective means of reducing energy consumption 
– and therefore carbon emissions.  Under the Energy 
Efficiency Commitment (EEC) energy suppliers are 
required to add a small percentage to consumer energy 
bills – and reuse the funds gained in activities that reduce 
household carbon emissions.  Under this scheme energy 
companies have, for example, distributed cheap or free 
energy efficient light bulbs to many homes.  The UK Energy 
White Paper proposes expanding this scheme to cover a 
wider range of technologies and activities to encourage 
behavioural change.  The Energy White Paper estimates 
that the measures proposed will add 1.5% to 2% to 
household energy bills.  Increased energy prices will also 
act as a spur for increased investment by consumers in 
energy efficiency.   The White Paper believes that over 
time the increase in electricity bills due to energy efficiency 
measures will be outweighed by reduced energy 
consumption – and therefore consumer energy bills could 
benefit from a net reduction.  However other studies 
suggest that the benefits from improved energy efficiency 
will be offset to some extent by households using money 
saved to consume additional goods and services – known 
as the rebound effect (though any rebound effect would 
seem likely to be weaker if energy prices are also 
increasing in parallel). 
 
Nuclear power 
The UK Government appears committed to the 
development of a new generation of nuclear power stations 
in the UK – and has stated that this development will be 
constructed and funded in full by the commercial sector. 
The commercial sector will then recover these costs 
through consumer electricity bills.   The Scottish 
Government is opposed to the development of new nuclear 
power stations in Scotland – but given that there is a GB 
electricity market it appears likely that the costs of 
developing nuclear power will be spread across all GB 
consumers. 
 
The UK Energy White Paper, and the associated 
consultation documents
20
, assert that the costs of nuclear 
power are comparable to other forms of conventional 
generation (and therefore implies that the cost to 
consumers will be no higher than the development of fossil-
fuelled generation).  Other analyses
21
 assert that attempts 
to estimate the total cost of nuclear power are unlikely to be 
accurate – and that the construction of nuclear power 
plants is subject to a number of significant risks that are 
likely to increase costs.  The calculation of the full costs of 
decommissioning and waste management is also difficult – 
as government policy and regulatory requirements may 
change over time.   The UK Government is apparently 
committed to commercial operators meeting the full cost of 
decommissioning and waste management, and to 
operators recovering these costs in full during the operation 
of  new nuclear power stations.
22
  However the UK 
Government has also committed to offering operators a 
fixed price for decommissioning and waste disposal
23
  - 
albeit with a margin for risk built in.  This appears to show 
that both UK Government and the energy industry believe 
there is a risk of cost escalation – and should the actual 
costs exceed the fixed price agreed then the gap will be 
met by the taxpayer.  This effectively represents a public 
subsidy to the construction and operation of new nuclear 
power stations. 
 
Given the uncertainty over the costs and timescales for the 
construction of new nuclear power stations (it is for 
example by no means clear that any new nuclear power 
stations will have been built by 2020) this paper has not 
factored in any additional costs for nuclear power in its 
estimates of future electricity prices. 
 
Conclusions 
The drive for cleaner, lower carbon electricity is likely to be 
with us for decades to come as Scotland, the UK, and the 
EU work to meet ambitious climate change targets.  This 
will require investment in new cleaner electricity generation, 
grid infrastructure and carbon storage systems.  This 
investment drive will not come without significant cost and 
current mechanisms will pass these costs on to the 
consumers of energy – homes and businesses.   In the UK 
the main additional regulatory costs will come through the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Renewables 
Obligation.  In addition energy companies may seek to 
increase prices in order achieve a commercial rate of return 
on sizable investments in new energy infrastructure.  As 
global energy demand continues to rise there are also likely 
to be additional price increases in the underlying costs of 
primary fuels (oil, gas, coal, uranium) – and these will 
create significant additional increases in the price of 
electricity.  Higher energy costs will also be transmitted by 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
Pages 63-69 
businesses into increased consumer prices for goods and 
services – and these will be particularly significant for those 
goods and materials that embody a large amount of energy 
in their manufacture (such as steel, concrete, some 
chemicals, paper, and some parts of the food and drink 
sector).   
 
Adding together the various measures detailed above 
suggests that without any underlying increase in primary 
energy prices by 2020 clean energy support and regulatory 
mechanisms can be expected to add at least 23% to 
household electricity prices and 30% to industrial electricity 
prices (primarily using the figures in the Energy White 
Paper), and if Deutsche Bank is right about the future costs 
of carbon allowances under the EU ETS the increase in 
electricity prices will be in the region of 42% for household 
energy users and 60% for industrial energy users.   
 
The UK Energy White Paper suggests that price increases 
will lie at the lower end of the above estimates, and that 
cost increases will in any case be offset very largely by 
improved energy efficiency.  It argues that improved energy 
efficiency will lead to an overall reduction in energy 
consumption (and therefore act to reduce energy bills).  But 
given our continuing propensity to increase consumption 
energy efficiency seems unlikely to deliver stable energy 
bills on its own.  Capturing the benefits of improved energy 
efficiency in homes and appliances will also depend on 
achieving widespread and long-term behavioural change.   
In addition, if energy price increases due to regulatory 
action lie at the upper end of the above range it is clear that 
energy efficiency measures (using the Energy White 
Paper’s figures) would not be sufficient to those offset price 
increases. 
 
There remains a question as to how to consumer demand 
for electricity would respond to long-term and significantly 
increased prices.  Classic economic theory suggests that 
as price increases consumption should drop.  However a 
wide range of studies
24 
show   that elasticity of consumer 
demand for electricity is relatively low – that is, demand   
neither increases dramatically when electricity prices are 
low, or reduces significantly when electricity prices increase 
(a 10% rise in electricity prices is estimated as resulting in 
a 2.1% fall in domestic demand in the short-run and a fall in 
demand of 1.8% in the long-run – providing incomes do not 
also rise in real terms).   Other sectors are more sensitive 
to prices rises – for the commercial and industrial sector 
electricity a 10% rise in all fuel prices is reckoned to result 
in a 3.3% fall in demand in the short-run and a 2.9% fall in 
the long-run.   As stated earlier, electricity prices have 
increased significantly over the last 4 years.  In 2006 
industrial electricity consumption dropped by 2% (the first 
time consumption had dropped for 5 years), but demand in 
the domestic sector remained steady.
25
   The low response 
of domestic demand to increases in prices could be 
because people consume the services that electricity 
enables (eg light, television, cups of tea, clean clothes) – 
rather than consuming the product itself – and that people 
are highly resistant to changing their behaviours in these 
areas. 
 
The final question is whether the response of electricity 
suppliers and generators to the various policy instruments 
detailed above is likely to have any additional impact on 
electricity prices.   The primary objective of the EU ETS is 
to reduce carbon emissions by altering producer behaviour 
(but not necessarily the power generation sector).  By 
trading emissions the theory of the EU ETS is that those 
sectors which can abate emissions more cheaply (or more 
quickly) will do so.  The nature of investment in electricity 
generation (where the infrastructure has very long 
timescales), and the lack of competition in the market 
(which means generators can pass costs through to 
consumers), probably means that the electricity sector will 
be slow to respond.  Some analysts speculate that the 
main impact of the EU ETS out to 2020 will be to push 
generators away from coal and towards gas-fired 
generation (as gas is a less carbon intensive fuel).  
Fundamentally this decision depends on the producers’ 
view of the future price of gas relative to coal once EU ETS 
is factored in (and their view of their ability to pass costs 
through).  Gas prices are indexed to oil prices, and 
therefore are currently high.    
 
Classic economic theory might also suggest that a 
reduction in consumer demand for electricity might led to 
producers reducing prices (in order to gain market share).  
However given that there is limited competition in the 
electricity sector producers might instead seek to maintain 
levels of return on investments by increasing electricity 
prices.  
 
__________________ 
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